

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 691213



## *WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS*

*Week Ending 13 December 1969*


**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**

*For the President Only*


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## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968 - 1969  
weekly average for each month




OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1969  
weekly data as reported\*




## US BATTLE DEATHS

decreased from the previous week's 100 to 86 for this week.




## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

also decreased from the 396 of last week to a reported 357 this week. The official totals for both these figures will change as late reports are received, and given the anomalies of the reporting system, these figures will almost certainly be considerably lower than the figure released to the press by the GVN for this period.




## INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

stand at seven battalion and five small-size groups observed in Laos during December for a total of about 4,300. Since late October, some 15,000 have been identified in the pipeline with another 5,000 possible; our present data thus strongly suggest pipeline inputs since 23 October may total as many as 20,000.




## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

rose again from the high 717 of last week to 750 this week. Of these totals, attacks by fire increased from the 139 of the previous week to 158 for this week.



## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

declined from the previous week's 2,469 to this week's 2,396.



## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS


as measured by percentage of total enemy killed by the SVN decreased from the previous week's 54% of enemy killed to this week's 50%.

\*Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The past week was characterized by increased enemy initiated incidents but decreased casualties on both sides. Increased light attacks by fire continued to be the enemy's prime means of showing his presence, although several limited ground probes in outlying areas were also noted. Most enemy casualties were caused by artillery and/or air support as the Communists continue to prepare for a new phase of attacks. All evidence indicates that the enemy is planning localized "high points" during the remainder of December, but evidence now available suggests that in cycling these "high points," the enemy plans to rely mainly on shellings, sapper attacks, and terrorism. Enemy main force units along the border or in base areas remain 25X1B generally out of action.



South Vietnam Developments

A US Mission survey of South Vietnamese military opinion about prospects for successful Vietnamization has produced mixed results. Many officers are cautiously optimistic, noting that field officers increasingly relish the opportunity to take on a greater share of the fighting. Others contend that such optimism stems more from the recent low level of Communist activity than from improvements, and think they will be in trouble when the enemy steps up his action. Confidence in Vietnamization will probably hinge on the outcome of future engagements. The actual results of "Vietnamization" to date have not proved disquieting to South Vietnam's military leadership and have, hence, bolstered Vietnamese self-confidence to at least some extent. But the added responsibility being thrust on GVN forces and diminished level of US participation has not yet produced any noticeable rise of morale or *esprit de corps* among the South Vietnamese forces. There is, in short, an absence of negative signs to date but, at the same time, little in the way of strong positive indicators in the spheres of Vietnamese morale and self-confidence.

Communist Developments

An unusual series of messages on North Vietnam's infiltration networks in Laos indicate that ten American prisoners, including one referred to as a "high ranking civilian" are being transferred northward. The prisoners are receiving special treatment and their movement is being given priority.

The Communists appear to be running into resistance from Cambodian military officials in their efforts to get arms shipped to their base areas along the South Vietnamese border by the end of December. The reluctance of these Cambodian officials to resume their illicit and profitable arms traffic can probably be attributed to Sihanouk's personal supervision of this project since limited deliveries were resumed last September and to growing concern over Communist violations of Cambodian territory.

The DRV's special security drive in North Vietnam is continuing. Although the nature of the problem has not been revealed, press editorials state it is aimed at "counter-revolutionary elements, . . . bad-minded elements, . . . and negative manifestations in social life." Language calling for "unanimity" of views suggests that the regime may be trying to weed out elements who are unresponsive to or are resisting certain regime policies. "Hooliganism" and blackmarketeering have also been cited as growing problems.

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